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COMMENT
THE IMPROPER USE OF TAX AND INSURANCE
ESCROW PAYMENTS BY MORTGAGEES
A particularly important consideration for all lenders is to secure their
loans. With insufficient security, a borrower's defaults can endanger a lender's
livelihood. Although real estate mortgagees can protect themselves against
ultimate loss by the process of foreclosure, this protection can prove inade-
quate if other liens, such as tax or water company liens, attach and obtain
priority over the mortgage' or encumber the resale of the property.2
Additionally, if property is uninsured and destroyed by some catastrophe,
foreclosure would be futile. Because of these dangers, mortgagees often
require mortgagors to make monthly payments to the lender equal to one-
twelfth of the estimated annual taxes, assessments, insurance premiums, and
other real estate charges in advance of their due date. When these bills
become due, the lender pays them on behalf of the mortgagor. This process
is the soundest way for mortgagees to protect their interest in the collateral
for the loan.
Two methods for collecting and holding these monthly payments have
been used extensively by lenders. Under the earlier method, that of capitali-
zation, the monthly payments were credited to the mortgage balance. When
the lender paid bills of the mortgagor, the mortgage balance was increased
accordingly. The more popular, current device is the noninterest-bearing
escrow or deposit account which provides for these payments to be held by
the mortgagee without reducing the borrower's mortgage balance.8 Unlike
1. Tax and utility company liens may lead to a forced public sale of the property
in order to satisfy the liens. The remainder of the sale price could be claimed by the
mortgagee. See G. OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF MORTGAGES 425-27 (1970).
See also UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-301 (priority of nonstatutory lien creditor
over Article 9 unperfected security interest).
2. At common law, the mortgagee was required to pay outstanding taxes and could
clear liens from the record. The amount expended could be added to the mortgage bal-
ance. 2 .L. JONES, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF MORTGAGES OF REAL PROPERTY § 883
(8th ed. 1928). See Comment, Payment of Interest on Mortgage Escrow Accounts:
Judicial and Legislative Developments, 23 SYRACUSE L. REV. 845, 846-47 (1972). Under
the present escrow system, there are never unpaid bills since the money to cover
these expenses is paid in advance.
3. See Comment, supra note 2, at 848-49. During the late 1960's, lenders began
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the capitalization method, under which the mortgagor gets the benefit of a
lower mortgage balance at the time that interest on the loan is calculated,
the escrow method deprives the mortgagor of the use of his money, does not
lower the mortgage balance, and, in effect, gives the lender a free loan. 4
This article will examine the escrow method and the various litigious
assaults upon its operation. Courts have been presented with four major
arguments against the use of the escrow device: that it violates the Truth in
Lending Act;5 that it constitutes a tying arrangement in violation of the
switching to the escrow method. The litigation reflects borrowers' concern over the
change. See, e.g., Graybeal v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 59 F.R.D. 7 (D.D.C.
1973); Kinee v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 365 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Pa.
1973); cases cited notes 14, 18, 73-80, 84-90 infra.
4. The available statistics are unclear as to the benefits for borrowers and lenders
under either method. Estimates range from hundreds of millions of dollars lost by bor-
rowers because of the escrow practice, see Note, Lender Accountability and the Problem
of Noninterest-Bearing Mortgage Escrow Accounts, 54 B.U.L REv. 516, 517 (1974);
Comment, supra note 2, at 850 n.28, to bankers' claims that both the escrow or the capi-
talization method are unprofitable since the maintenance costs offset profits earned. See
Comments Folder 75-81 to Proposed Amendment of 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11 (1974), Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank Board (file closed March 4, 1975); Note, 54 B.U.L. REv., supra,
at 517, 533-34; Comment, The Attack Upon the Tax and Insurance Escrow Accounts
in Mortgages, 47 TEMp. L.Q. 352, 368 (1974). See also Raab v. Bowery Sav. Bank,
77 Misc. 2d 1054, 355 N.Y.S.2d 748 (N.Y. County Small Cl. 1974); McKully v. Radack,
27 Md. App. 350, 340 A.2d 374 (1975). McKully adds credence to the higher estimates
of profits derived by lenders. The case involved the bankruptcy of a limited partnership
which had an escrow account containing $17,000 for taxes and insurance at the time-
of bankruptcy. Obviously, a lender with free use of funds in sums as great as this could
profit greatly by investing for his own benefit.
At least one court has approved a lender's retention of profits earned from these es-
crow accounts. After examining the practical necessity for maintaining escrows, the
court in Foster v. Maryland State Say. & Loan Ass'n, 369 F. Supp. 843 (D.D.C. 1974),
stated:
Moreover, there is a strong public policy which favors the practice of collecting
in advance real estate taxes and insurance premiums. It extends to the bor-
rower a useful and desirable service, much in the same manner that the Fed-
eral and state governments "withhold" taxes to insure that funds are available
when the taxes become due. Defendants should not necessarily be expected
to perform this service gratis. That they did so in the past does not render
discontinuance unconscionable. Whether they do so in the future will be deter-
mined by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and the competitive forces of
the market place.
Id. at 848. See also Buchanan v. Brentwood Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 457 Pa. 135, 141,
320 A.2d 117, 121 (1974); Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 252 Ark. 849, 481
S.W.2d 725 (1972).
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1681 (1970). See, e.g., Umdenstock v. American Mortgage &
Inv. Co., 495 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1974); Stavrides v. Mellon Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
353 F. Supp. 1072 (W.D. Pa.), affd, 487 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1973); Kinee v. Abraham
Lincoln Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 365 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Munn v. American
Gen. Inv. Corp., 364 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
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Sherman Act6 and Clayton Act; 7 that lenders have conspired to restrain trade
in violation of the Sherman Act; and that lenders breach their fiduciary
duty if they commingle the escrow accounts for their own use and benefit.
The first three claims are based on federal law and are considered together.
The fourth claim is based on common law and is examined separately.
Before proceeding to a discussion of the substantive issues outlined above,
however, it is necessary to briefly elucidate the rationale underlying these
payments for tax and insurance and the extent to which this practice is
utilized. Authorization to collect monthly payments from the mortgagor has
been conferred on mortgagees primarily by the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board (FHLBB), which governs all federal savings and loan associations
and other member institutions.8 The need for more adequate mortgage
security became apparent during the 1930's when homeowners found taxes
and property insurance especially difficult to afford. Banks began requiring
monthly prepayments in an attempt to curtail the increasing number of tax
lien foreclosures. 9 Since 1958, the FHLBB's regulation has stated that a
federal association "may require" -these monthly payments. 10 As is apparent
from the cases discussed below, many lending institutions have exercised this
power. In addition, the Veterans Administration (VA) and the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA) regulations mandate the establishment of
escrow accounts for monthly payments." Due to the various permissive and
mandatory regulations, the practice is sufficiently widespread to affect a sig-
nificant number of mortgage institutions.
I. FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION: TRUTH IN LENDING
AND ANTITRUST CLAIMS
Federal court jurisdiction over tax and insurance escrow cases obtains
when a plaintiff makes truth in lending and antitrust claims;' 2 challengers
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1970). See, e.g., cases cited note 5 supra.
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 14-18 (1970). See, e.g., cases cited note 5 supra.
8. Federal savings and loan associations must be members of the FHLBB. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464(f) (1970). Building and loan associations, savings banks, cooperative banks,
and insurance companies are also eligible to join. See GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRA-
TION, UNITED STATES GovERNMENT MANUAL 478, 480-81 (1975-76).
9. See Buchanan v. Brentwood Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 457 Pa. 135, 141, 320 A.2d
117, 121 (1974) (examination of the history of such payments); Comment, supra
note 4, at 352.
10. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11 (1975).
11. 38 C.F.R. § 36.4512 (1975) (Veterans Administration); 24 C.F.R. § 203.23(a)
(1975) (Federal Housing Administration).
12. Plaintiffs in both antitrust and truth in lending actions are exempt from jurisdic-
tional amount requirements. 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970) (antitrust); 15 U.S.C. § 1640
(1970) (truth in lending).
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of the escrow device have often urged the court to take pendent jurisdiction
over the state based claim of breach of fiduciary duty. 13 Nearly all of these
actions have been dismissed in pretrial proceedings, however. 14
Plaintiffs relying on the Truth in Lending Act assert that the monthly
payments are actually finance charges in disguise; failure to disclose these
finance charges arguably violates the Act." The federal courts, however,
have uniformly rejected this argument, noting that provisions in both the
Truth in Lending Act" and Regulation Z'7 promulgated thereunder, specif-
ically exempt such payments from disclosure."' The language of the Act and
Regulation Z is indeed relevant; the Act exempts from disclosure "escrows
for future payments of taxes and insurance,""9 and Regulation Z exempts
"[a]mounts required to be placed or paid into an escrow or trustee account
for future payments of taxes, insurance, and water, sewer, and land rents."'20
If in drafting the Truth in Lending Act Congress intended that "escrow"
be construed in its strict legal sense,21 the exemption from disclosure is logical,
13. See generally United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966) (if state and
federal claims arise out of a common nucleus of operative facts, the federal court may
take jurisdiction over all claims in the case).
14. See, e.g., Munn v. American Gen. Inv. Corp., 364 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
Litigants apparently view federal court to be preferable to state court for escrow suits.
If they can convince a trial court that the Gibbs test, see note 13 supra, is met, state
and federal claims may be litigated simultaneously. 3A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
18.07,[1.3] (2d ed. 1974). See also Gibson v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 364
F. Supp. 614 (E.D. Mich. 1973), afj'd, 504 F.2d 826 (6th Cir. 1974) (no pendent juris-
diction when claimants argued breach of fiduciary duty, a nonfederal claim, and violation
of federal regulations).
15. Truth in Lending Act § 129, 15 U.S.C. § 1639 (1970). See cases cited note 18
infra.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 1605(e) (1970).
17. 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(e)(3) (1975).
18. See, e.g., Umdenstock v. American Mortgage & Inv. Co., 495 F.2d 589 (10th Cir.
1974); Foster v. Maryland State Say. & Loan Ass'n, 369 F. Supp. 843 (D.D.C. 1974);
Stavrides v. Mellon Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 353 F. Supp. 1072 (W.D. Pa.), af!'d, 487
F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1973); Graybeal v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 59 F.R.D. 7
(D.D.C. 1973); Kinee v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 365 F. Supp. 975
(E.D. Pa. 1973).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1605(e) (1970).
20. 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(e)(3) (1975).
21. The House and Conference Reports are silent as to whether "escrow" was meant
in a technical, legal sense, requiring segregation and noninvestment of the funds. See
H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); CONF. REP. No. 1397, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1968). If the drafters of the statute had not intended to impute legal significance
to the words selected, they might have used a more general term, such as "on deposit"
or "account." Instead, Regulation Z refers to the payments as "an escrow or trustee
account." 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(e)(3) (1975). The importance of this terminology is rel-
1975]
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because while the Act contemplates disclosure of profitmaklng charges, a true
escrow requires the lender to segregate and hold the funds without profiting
therefrom.2 2 It is thus arguable that the Act's exemption applies only to true
escrow accounts. But when monthly payments, though termed escrow ac-
counts, are actually collected by the lender to derive profits, they are not trite
escrows and should not be accorded exempt status by the courts. 28 Otherwise,
the Truth in Lending Act's mandate that finance charges be disclosed would
be circumvented.
The antitrust tying arrangement allegations, which contend that a lender is
tying together escrow accounts and mortgage loans, have a sounder legal
basis than do the truth in lending claims. The escrow tying arrangement cases
argued in federal courts thus far have involved motions to dismiss and motions
for summary judgment. Although the courts in all of these cases have rejected
the truth in lending claims, 24 the antitrust claims have been remanded for
trial without a decision on the merits; the state law claims have been dis-
missed on jurisdictional grounds. 25
Tie-ins have been defined as "an agreement by a party to sell one product
[tying product] but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a
different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase that
product from any other supplier."'26 Such arrangements may be subject to at-
tack under section 3 of the Clayton Act and section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The Clayton Act makes unlawful only those tying arrangements involving
"goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies and other commodities
...." which may have the effect of substantially lessening competition or
tending to create a monopoly.2 7 In contrast, the Sherman Act makes unlawful
every tying arrangement which is an unreasonable restraint of trade. 28 An
alternative means of establishing an antitrust violation is to prove that lenders
have conspired to restrain trade by agreeing to offer mortgagors only nonin-
terest-bearing escrow accounts. 29 Arguably, the escrow arrangement violates
evant to the fiduciary duty discussion, see pp. 115-19 infra, when the outcome of litiga-
tion turns on the interpretation of contract language.
22. See p. 117 inf ra.
23. See cases discussed pp. 117-19 infra ("escrow" broadly construed).
24. See cases cited note 18 supra.
25. Pendent jurisdiction over the state based claim has been rejected, generally as not
arising out of a common nucleus of operative fact with the antitrust claims. See, e.g.,
Umdenstock v. American Mortgage & Inv. Co., 495 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1974) (breach
of fiduciary duty claim dismissed).
26. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958). See Pearson,
Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Policy, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 626, 627 (1965).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970). For the full text of the section see note 39 infra.
28. Id. § 1 (1970). See also note 29 infra.
29. Id. See pp. 109-15 infra. This theory of conspiracy to restrain trade is often ap-
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one or both of these theories, as is apparent from an examination of the es-
crow cases brought in federal court.
In considering the antitrust charges, a threshold issue is whether there ex-
ists sufficient contact with interstate commerce for the federal court to exer-
cise subject matter jurisdiction. In Stavrides v. Mellon National Bank & Trust
Co.,5 0 the court examined the substantive antitrust arguments and concluded
that, in light of the normal flow of banking business, the arrangement had
a significant enough connection to interstate commerce to warrant jurisdic-
tion, even though the mortgage loans were made primarily intrastate. 31 The
court further stated that the tying arrangement alleged to exist between the
escrow and the mortgage was conceivable but somewhat strained. The parties
were ordered to proceed with discovery on the antitrust issues.
A fuller discussion of the conspiracy and tying arrangement antitrust
claims appears in Kinee v. Abraham Lincoln Federal Savings & Loan
Association.3 2 Plaintiffs there alleged that all of the lending institutions in
the Philadelphia area had conspired to switch from the capitalization to the
escrow method, and that the escrow and mortgage practice was an illegal
tying arrangement in restraint of trade. Although one-third of the 177
defendants were dismissed because they did not use the escrow method,33i
the court nevertheless stated that the alleged conspiracy might constitute a
provable antitrust violation because of the plaintiffs' plausible contention that
most of the mortgage lenders conspired to eliminate the capitalization
method from the market. In addition, the court determined that the tie-in
allegations were conceivable because the escrow arrangement and the mort-
plied in price fixing cases. See, e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253
(1962) (manufacturer's restriction on distributors' pricing constitutes vertical arrange-
ment in restraint of trade); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951)
(agreement among competitors to fix prices on liquor constitutes horizontal restraint of
trade).
30. 353 F. Supp. 1072 (W.D. Pa.) alf'd, 487 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1973). The court
retained jurisdiction over the antitrust claims, but dismissed the truth in lending and state
claims.
31. 353 F. Supp. at 1075. The court stated:
[We will not assume at this stage of the suit that the defendants do not receive
some increase in assets or profits as a result of this residential mortgage busi-
ness and that these increased assets and/or profits do not make their way
through the normal course of the banking business into interstate commerce.
Id. Contra, Spens v. Citizens Fed. Sav. & Loan, 364 F. Supp. 1161 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
32. 365 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
33. Apparently, the plaintiffs had joined every lending institution listed in the phone
book without investigating whether they used the escrow method. As a result, the judge
ordered the plaintiffs' attorneys to pay to the 46 dismissed defendants the amount of le-
gal expenses incurred in defending the suit. 365 F. Supp. at 982-83.
'1975]
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gage loans were separate products susceptible of being tied together.84 Conse-
quently, further discovery, not dismissal, was deemed most appropriate
under the circumstances.
A less difficult to prove conspiracy concept was asserted before the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Umdenstock v. American
Mortgage & Investment Co.3 5 Instead of charging that an overt conspiracy
existed among lenders, the plaintiffs urged that mortgagees utilizing the
escrow device were guilty of "conscious parallelism," a vague antitrust
concept that falls short of conspiracy but entails more than mere independent
action in restraint of trade. In discussing this allegation, the court noted that
summary judgment in antitrust cases has met with judicial disfavor because
the evidence is often exclusively in the defendant's handsA6 As a result, the
court ruled that a plaintiff should be afforded at least the opportunity to
conduct discovery before summary judgment on the conspiracy issue is
considered.
While these decisions have not reached the merits of the antitrust claims,
they indicate that the alleged violations may be substantiated. An examina-
tion of the tie-in arrangement theory is helpful in determining the possible
outcome of a trial predicated on such a theory; discussion of "conscious
parallelism" will aid in deciding whether the lenders' behavior falls within this
antitrust conspiracy concept.
'Before exploring the standards of illegality for tying arrangements, how-
ever, it is necessary to determine the applicability of the Sherman and Clay-
ton Acts to escrow tying arrangements. While such arrangements are clearly
within the scope of the Sherman Act, which applies to every contract in re-
straint of trade,3 7 there is considerable question whether a mortgage loan as
the tying product and an escrow deposit as the tied product are "commodi-
ties" subject to the Clayton Act.
34. For a discussion of the separate products requirement, see Fortner Enterprises,
Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 507 (1969); Times-Picayune Publishing
Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 613-14 (1953); Warriner Hermetics, Inc. v. Cope-
land Refrigeration Corp., 463 F.2d 1002, 1012-16 (5th Cir. 1972).
35. 495 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1974). The court affirmed summary judgment for the
defendant on a truth in lending claim, but remanded the antitrust claims.
36. 495 F.2d at 592. The Supreme Court has stated that summary judgment should
be used sparingly in antitrust cases. See Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368
U.S. 464, 473 (1962). See generally 6 J. MOORE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTIcE 56.15,
56.17[5] (2d ed. 1974).
37. The language of section 1 covers "[elvery contract, combination . . . or con-
spiracy in restraint of trade," and thus, unlike section 3 of the Clayton Act, places no
limits upon the types of tied or tying products which are potentially subject to its pro-
visions. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970).
[Vol. 25:102
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A. Tying Agreements
Mortgage Loans as a "Commodity" Within the Clayton Act. The leading
case on the question of whether home loan money can be a tying product
which is subject to the Clayton Act is United States v. Investors Diversified
Services, Inc.,3 8 in which it was alleged that the requirement that borrowers
permit only the mortgagee to write, place, or sell hazard insurance for prop-
erty constituted an illegal tying arrangement. The court looked to the wording
of section 3 of the Clayton Act to decide "whether a loan of money secured
by a real estate mortgage constitutes a lease or a sale or a contract for sale
of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities
.... ,,39 After deciding that a loan is not a sale in the usual business sense,
the court employed the principle of ejusdem generis40 in interpreting the
Clayton Act provision. The court concluded that since the phrase "other com-
modities" must be read to mean commodities of the same class or kind as
goods, wares and merchandise, the term does not include money, which in
the court's view constitutes a "medium of exchange."' 41 By ruling that there
was no-section 3 violation, the court avoided the question of whether the in-
surance writing was covered in the words of the statute or if, under the stat-
ute, it could be viewed as a tied product.
The Investors Diversified Services decision was soundly criticized by some
-commentators.42 Although no decisive authority existed for the proposition
that money was covered by the antitrust statute, one of the decision's critics
38. 102 F. Supp. 645 (D. Minn. 1951).
39. Id. at 647.
15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares,
merchandise, machinery, supplies, or any other commodities. . . on the condi-
tion, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not
use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other
commodities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the
effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or
understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce.
40. Ejusdem generis is the principle of statutory construction which requires that
when a general term is used at the end of a series of specific terms, the general term
shall be interpreted to include only items of the same kind or class as those specifically
enumerated. See United States v. Chase, 135 U.S. 255 (1890); 2A C. SANDS, SUTHER-
LAND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION § § 47.17-47.22 (4th ed. 1973).
41. 102 F. Supp. at 648.
42. See, e.g., 52 COLUM. L. REV. 1066 (1952). The author charged that the
decision was based on unsound authority, namely, Curtis Publishing Co. v. FTC, 270
F. 881 (3d Cir. 1921), aff'd, 260 U.S. 568 (1923). Curtis was an agency case involving
a contract between principal and agent. It bears no relation to the loan contract at issue
in Investors Diversified Services.
1975]
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looked to "[t]he legislative history of the Clayton Act [which] indicates
that, had the specific question been raised, Congress would have considered
money a commodity within the meaning of § 3.'' 43 No case has directly
raised this issue again. However, the Justice Department continued to press
its Sherman Act claim, resulting in a consent decree which enjoined Investors
Diversified from maintaining the tying arrangement; thereafter, it took
the official position that tying sales of hazard insurance with mortgage loans
was a prima facie restraint of trade.44
In addition, the Supreme Court in Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United
States Steel Corp.,4 while considering whether an alleged tie-in of credit to
the sale of prefabricated homes could violate section 1 of the Sherman Act,
stated that ". . . money is a fungible commodity-like wheat or, for that
matter, unfinished steel . . . . 46 Thus, despite the Investors Diversified
Services conclusion, it is apparent from Justice Black's statement that the Su-
preme Court could find that commodities include mortgage money loans.
Deposit Services as a "Commodity" within the Clayton Act. Equally con-
troversial is the issue of whether the bank deposit service is a commodity.
Many cases have followed the restrictive interpretation established by In-
vestors Diversified Services, defining a commodity as a tangible product, dis-
tinguishable from a service. 47 Banking, and the escrow method in particular,
has been characterized as a service by courts and commentators, 48 making
43. 52 COLuM. L. REv. 1062, 1068 (1952).
44. TRADE RE. REP. (1954 Trade Cases) 67,799 at 69,574 (D. Minn. 1954). The
Justice Department transmitted to the Federal Housing and Veterans Administrations its
policy entitled "The Position of the Department of Justice Regarding the Tying of
Hazard Insurance to Mortgage Loans," which the agencies distributed to FHA and VA
Mortgagees. See, e.g., Letter from Stanley N. Barnes, Assistant Attorney General, to
Norman P. Mason, FHA Commissioner, July 1955; Letter from Norman P. Mason,
to All Approved Mortgagees, Oct. 28, 1955.
45. 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
46. Id. at 509.
47. "Commodities" have been found not to include the following "services": mutual
funds, Baum v. Investors Diversified Serv., Inc., 409 F.2d 872 (7th Cir. 1969); the priv-
ilege of the right to broadcast vocally, Tri-State Broadcasting Co. v. United Press Int'l,
Inc., 369 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1966); bus transportation, Fleetway, Inc. v. Public Serv.
Interstate Transp. Co., 72 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1935); loans to theaters to induce purchase
of products, Wendkos v. ABC Consol. Corp., 379 F. Supp. 15 (E.D. Pa. 1974); sale
of admission tickets, Kennedy Theater Ticket Serv. v. Ticketron, Inc., 342 F. Supp.
922 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
48. See, e.g., Foster v. Maryland State Say. & Loan Ass'n, 369 F. Supp. 843, 848
(D.D.C. 1974) (escrow characterized as a useful and desirable service); Tucker v. Pu-
laski Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 252 Ark. 849, 481 S.W.2d 725 (1972). See generally 1
MIcIE ON BANKS AND BANKING, ch. 1, § 2, at 9 (Michie Pub. Co. ed. 1973); 5 H. TouL-
MIN, A TREATISE ON THE ANTI-TRUST LAws OF THE UNITED STATES § 2.1-2.2 (1950)
(suggesting that if antitrust laws extend to insurance, they should similarly extend to
banking services).
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it unlikely that a court would regard bank activities as commodities. How-
ever, other courts have found the sale of a product tied to a mandatory serv-
ices contract to be an illegal tie-in. 49 At least one authority states that
"[e]ither or both of the tying and tied 'products' may be a service," 50 and
the Supreme Court, when it found in Fortner Enterprises that credit had been
illegally tied in, stated in a different context that it could "find no basis for
treating credit differently in principle from other goods and services." 51 Thus,
services are arguably within the commodities definition, and as such, they are
proper subjects for Clayton Act enforcement.
Tying Arrangement Standards. Although at one time the Supreme Court
indicated that the test of illegality for a tying arrangement under the Sherman
Act was more stringent than that of the Clayton Act,5 2 any distinction
between the two appears to have been eviscerated by later decisions.5 3
A violation of the Sherman and Clayton Acts requires that the defendant
have some dominance in the relevant field in order for the tie-in to constitute
a restraint of trade.5 4 Occasionally, this dominance is called "leverage." 55
Two major Supreme Court decisions have established the applicable stand-
ard for dominance or leverage. In the first, Northern Pacific Railway Co. v.
United States,56 Justice Black, writing for the majority, stated:
49. See, e.g., United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa.),
affd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). See generally Austin, The Tying Arrangement:
A Critique and Some New Thoughts, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 88, 95.
50. Pearson, supra note 26, at 627 n.5. The term "product" might imply that it is
limited to tangible, saleable items. Some cases, however, indicate a broader, nonre-
strictive definition for "product" that includes services. See note 48 supra.
51. 394 U.S. at 509.
52. See, e.g., Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
The Court stated that a substantial lessening of competition would be inferred under sec-
tion 3 of the Clayton Act when the seller enjoys a monopolistic position in the tying
product's market or when the arrangement restrains a substantial volume of commerce
in the tied product, but that section 1 of the Sherman Act would ban such an arrange-
ment only when both conditions were satisfied. Id. at 608-09.
53. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), in which the
Court cut back on the dual standard of Times-Picayune, see note 52 supra, by stating
that a tying arrangement would violate section 1 of the Sherman Act if the seller enjoyed
sufficient economic power to appreciably restrain free competition in the tied product,
thus eliminating the requirement of "monopoly power" or "dominance" before per se un-
reasonableness under section 1 could be found. Id. at 11.
54. See cases cited notes 56 & 58 infra; Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements
Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HARv. L. REv. 50, 55-58 (1958).
55. "Leverage" is the economic power necessary to impair freedom of choice and has
been explained by one authority as "nothing more than the use by a seller of a particular
combination of resources-a combination which establishes his position in the market-
to secure the most favorable terms he can from his customers; that is, he is maximizing
his profits." Pearson, supra note 26, at 642.
56. 356 U.S. 1 (1958). Northern Pacific Railway sold deeds and entered leases
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Indeed "tying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the
suppression of competition." . . . They deny competitors free ac-
cess to the market for the tied product, not because the party im-
posing the tying requirements has a better product or a lower
price but because of his power or leverage in another market ...
They are unreasonable in and of themselves whenever a party has
sufficient economic power with respect to the tying product to
appreciably restrain free competition in the market for the tied
product and a "not insubstantial" amount of interstate commerce
is affected. 57
A number of years later, in United States v. Loew's, Inc.,58 the Court
broadened the concept of economic power beyond the size and power of the
defendant by stating that "even absent a showing of market dominance, the
crucial economic power may be inferred from the tying product's desirability
to consumers or from uniqueness in its attributes." 59
Although these two decisions formed the basic test for deciding whether an
alleged tie-in constitutes an antitrust violation, the applicable standard
apparently required further clarification. In Fortner Enterprises, the Court
attempted to set a method of application for the standard by suggesting that
sufficient economic power does not depend on the defendant's ability to
monopolize a total market for the tied product. Dominance is to be tested
primarily by a new standard: ". . . . the proper focus of concern is whether
the seller has the power to raise prices, or impose other burdensome terms
such as a tie-in, with respect to any appreciable number of buyers within the
market." 60
for several million acres of land. The instruments contained a restriction that purchas-
ers and lessees must ship all commodities produced or manufactured on the land via the
railroad's lines. These preferential routing provisions were deemed to restrain trade and
the Court held that the railroad was enjoined from enforcement of these clauses.
57. Id. at 6.
58. 371 U.S. 38 (1962). The defendant movie company sold or licensed patented
feature films to television stations, upon the condition that the station accept a package
of one or more unwanted or inferior films. This block booking was deemed a restraint
on trade because it tied unwanted movies to the sale of unique and desirable films.
59. ld. at 45.
60. 394 U.S. 495, 504 (1965). In Fortner Enterprises, the United States Steel Home
Credit Corporation extended credit (an intangible commodity) only if the purchaser
bought a prefabricated house from United States Steel; this was held to be an illegal
tying arrangement. Justice Black, writing for the majority, stated that sufficient eco-
nomic power
does not . . . require that the defendant have a monopoly or even a dominant
position throughout the market for the tying product. Our tie-in cases have
made unmistakably clear that the economic power over the tying product can
be sufficient even though the power falls far short of dominance and even
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When the standard established by Northern Pacific and Loew's, as
clarified in Fortner Enterprises, is applied to the escrow method, the focus
centers on a combination of factors: the extent to which the escrow method
is utilized, whether those practicing the method are in such a position in the
mortgage market that they can tie in the escrow service, and whether the
mortgage offers of the mortgagees are unique or desirable to consumers. It is
important to note, according to the Fortner Enterprises test, that the
mortgagee need not control the whole market, but only an appreciable
number of buyers.
One court has considered the argument that the escrow method satisfies
the per se standard of Fortner Enterprises. In Spens v. Citizens Federal Sav-
ings & Loan Association,6 ' the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois granted the defendants' motion to dismiss after deciding
that the defendants lacked sufficient economic power to control the market.
In dismissing the complaint, the court questioned the effect of the escrow
practice on interstate commerce, and considered the complaint substantively
deficient because each defendant was alleged to have a tie-in but no individual
defendant was alleged to have sufficient economic power to impose the tie-in.
Since the borrowers could obtain mortgages elsewhere without the escrow, the
court concluded that there was no restraint on the market.62 Significantly, the
court failed to follow the general guidelines for permitting preliminary
discovery in antitrust cases: examination of the number of borrowers,
uniqueness of the mortgage offers, and inquiries into the market power of the
defendants. It is possible that such inquiries might lead another court to reach
a contrary conclusion.
Finally, it must be stressed that even failure to satisfy the per se standard
will not necessarily preclude a plaintiff from prevailing on his Sherman Act
tying claim. Under the broader rule-of-reason standard "[a] plaintiff can still
prevail on the merits whenever he can prove, on the basis of a more thorough
examination of the purposes and effects of the practices involved, that the
though the power exists only with respect to some of the buyers in the market.
• .. "Even absent a showing of market dominance, the crucial economic
power may be inferred from the tying product's desirability to consumers or
from uniqueness in its attributes."
Id. at 502-03, quoting United States v. Loews, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962).
61. 364 F. Supp. 1161 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
62. Id. at 1163. In addition, the court found that a valid defense, that of business
necessity, was established by the defendants. Generally, the business necessity defense
is justifiable when a new product is being introduced into a highly competitive market-
and then only for a limited period of time. For a fuller discussion of this and other
valid defenses to antitrust allegations, see Austin, supra note 49.
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general purposes of the Sherman Act have been violated. '63 Thus, if a plain-
tiff can establish that the escrow tying arrangement was so anticompetitive
as to constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade, his challenge may be suc-
cessful.
B. Conspiracy to Restrain Trade-Conscious Parallelism Standards
Admittedly, establishing sufficient economic power to impose a tie-in
arrangement might be the weakest link in the borrowers' antitrust arguments.
The gap may be bridged, however, by establishing that the lenders engaged
in consciously parallel behavior indicative of a conspiracy in restraint of trade,
violating section 1 of the Sherman Act. Since conscious parallelism is usually
discussed in a sales or price fixing context, it is a difficult concept to apply
in the escrow situation. It appears to be an ill-defined conspiracy concept re-
quiring less than express agreement but more than independent identical ac-
tions. As one commentator noted:
[C]onscious parallelism is never meaningful by itself, but always
assumes whatever significance it might have from additional
facts. Thus, conscious parrallelism is not even evidence of agree-
ment unless there are some other facts indicating that the decisions
of the alleged conspirators were interdependent, that the decisions
were consistent with the individual self-interest of those concerned
only if they all decided [sic] the same way.64
Another commentator has stated that conscious parallelism could be defined
as a quasi-agreement: " '[W]hen a number of enterprises follow a parallel
course of action in the knowledge and contemplation of the fact that all are
acting alike, they have, in effect, formed an agreement.' "65
Establishing that lenders acted in a consciously parallel manner would
require extensive discovery to determine the number of lenders using
escrows, whether leading lenders converted to escrows first, and how quickly
thereafter other lenders changed to escrows from capitalization. The large
number of such changeovers in the late 1960's and early 1970's instigated
the filing of the suits discussed above. 66
Demonstrating that the self-interest of the lenders is advanced only if they
act interdependently is not a difficult task. If all the major lenders in an area
who have the economic ability to offer the most favorable mortgage terms to
borrowers utilize the escrow method, then mortgagors have no real choice in
63. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 500 (1969).
64. Turner, The Definition of Agreement under the Sherman Act: Conscious Paral-
lelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARv. L. REv. 655, 658 (1962). See Rahl, Conspiracy
and the Anti-Trust Laws, 44 ILL. (N.W.) U.L. REv. 743 (1950).
65. Rahl, supra note 64, at 761 n.66, quoting FTC policy statement, Oct. 12, 1948.
66. See pp. 107-08 supra.
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obtaining a favorable loan. Borrowers looking for the best mortgage terms
must also accept the escrow conditions. As a result, all these lenders gain the
use of the escrow funds and any profits derived therefrom. Yet if some major
lenders refused to follow suit by not using the escrow tie-in, the borrowers
would be likely to patronize these nonescrow lenders to obtain a loan on
terms as favorable as those offered by the escrow lenders. The borrowers
would gain the benefit of any alternative system the nonescrow lenders use,
whether capitalization, an interest paying account, or the option of retaining
the tax and insurance money. Thus, the effect of nonconformity among lend-
ers would be to force open competition which might deprive lenders of the
profits they now gain ,by use of the escrow method. Consequently, as long
as the lenders who attract an appreciable number of borrowers act in this
consciously parallel manner, they continue to benefit.
Statistics compiled by the mortgage industry67 may well support the exist-
ence of conscious parallelism. The United States Savings and Loan League,
which represents a significant number of savings and loan associations, has
issued a survey showing that 83.6 percent of such institutions used the escrow
method and that those same lenders represented 92.0 percent of the total as-
sets of those responding to the inquiry. 68 The capitalization method was em-
ployed by only 16.4 percent of the respondents, representing 8 percent of
the total assets of the same responding group. 69 Since the survey was weighted
toward the views of the larger savings and loan associations,7 0 it indicates
that most of the larger institutions which control the greatest number of bor-
rowers in the mortgage market use the escrow method. Significant questions
remain, however, regarding when this method was adopted and whether
smaller institutions knowingly switched to the escrow device with the intent
of imitating the larger lenders. 71
II. STATE COURT LITIGATION BASED ON BREACH OF FIDUCIARY
DUTY CLAIM
The theory underlying a plaintiff's claim to interest and/or profits derived
from the use of the collected funds is a simple one: the payments are the
67. United States Say. & Loan League, Factors Governing the Economics of Escrow
Accounts (Jan. 1973), in FHLBB Comments Folder, supra note 4 [hereinafter cited as
Escrow Study].
68. The survey states that 20.8 percent of the member institutions responded to the
questionnaire. These institutions represented 40.8 percent of the total national savings
and loan assets. Escrow Study 2. Thus, this report reflects the practice of the larger
and, logically, the more influential savings and loan associations.
69. Escrow Study 3.
70. Id. 2. See note 68 supra.
71. These inquiries might supply the evidence necessary to successfully assert the
charge of conscious parallelism. See pp. 106-07 supra.
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property of the mortgagors, to be used by the mortgagee exclusively' for a
specific purpose. By using the money for its own benefit, the lender breaches
the fiduciary duty accompanying the special deposit or trust account. Thus,
either interest should be paid to the mortgagor for the use of his money or,
alternatively, there should be an equitable accounting of, and constructive
trust placed on, the profits generated. State courts have differed in their
responses to this rationale.72
In the earliest of the fiduciary duty cases, Sears v. First Federal Savings &
Loan Association,73 the court interpreted the mortgage contract language to
determine the intent of the parties. The contract permitted three optional
methods for the 'bank holding tax, insurance, and other assessed monthly
payments: a trust account without interest, "carrying" the payments in an
account, and capitalization. The bank opted for the second method and
maintained an account on the ledgers, but commingled the funds. In the
absence of an explicit duty to segregate the funds, and because the only
contract obligation was to pay the bills when due, the court found no intent
to create a trust or special deposit (nor was there found a res), as required for
an actual trust. Consequently, the court concluded, there could be no breach
of fiduciary duty as long as the parties' contract did not specify a trust
obligation.
Subsequent cases have followed the Sears reasoning. In Zelickman v.
Bell Federal Savings & Loan Association,7 4 the Illinois Court of Appeals
decided that the term "deposit" in the mortgage contract, absent an explicitly
defined duty to segregate, could not be construed as creating a trust
account. 75 The court stated that the fund in question was held only as
additional security for the payment of bills. And in Durkee v. Franklin
Savings Association,76 decided by the same court, the contract language spe-
72. See generally Annot., 50 A.L.R.3d 697 (1973).
73. 1 Ill. App. 3d 621,275 N.E.2d 300 (1971).
74. 13 Ill. App. 3d 578, 301 N.E.2d 47 (1973). Plaintiffs sought an account-
ing on behalf of a class of mortgagors to impose a constructive trust on all earnings
derived from lenders' use of the escrow funds. The court dismissed the complaint for
failure to state a cause of action.
75. The court distinguished this case from Carpenter v. Suffolk Franklin Say. Bank,
291 N.E.2d 609 (Mass. 1973) (holding that the complaint alleging the bank breached
its fiduciary duty by commingling and deriving benefits from the escrows stated a cause
of action), because in Carpenter the word "escrow" was relied upon to find a breach
of fiduciary duty. 13 Ill. App. at 586, 301 N.E.2d at 53. It should be noted that
the FHLBB regulations authorizing these deposits call the accounts "escrows." See
notes 133-35 and accompanying text infra.
76. 17 Ill. App. 3d 978, 309 N.E.2d 118 (1974). The plaintiffs' claim for
all profits derived from defendants' use of the deposits was dismissed for failure to state
a cause of action.
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cifically permitted the bank to commingle monthly payments instead of di-
recting the bank to place the funds in a savings account. Since there existed
no agreement requiring segregation or remuneration to the depositor for use
of the funds, the court found that they could not be deemed a special deposit
or bailment. Rather, the bank was permitted to use the funds for its own
benefit. 77
Countering the Illinois cases is Tierney v. Whitestone Savings & Loan
Association,78 in which a New York court stressed that the deposits were
called "security" in the particular mortgage contract and credited in an
"escrow" ledger. Because the legal obligation accompanying an escrow is that
of segregating the funds,79 and commingling defeats the purpose of keeping
the funds secure for eventual payment of the mortgagor's bills, the court
concluded that the bank breached its fiduciary duty by its own use of the
funds.80
Determining the intent of the parties in an escrow situation is more
difficult in the absence of an express contract provision. Mortgage contracts
or promissory notes usually are silent concerning the particular manner in
which deposits are to be held. The general rule is that when there is no
express agreement as to an alleged trust, the circumstances surrounding the
transaction must be examined to determine whether a trust or debt is
created.8 ' In order to examine adequately these circumstances, general
principles of banking law must be considered.
Deposits are made into one of three types of bank accounts: general,
special, or special for a specific purpose.82 A general account creates a
77. The court found the Sears and Zelickman holdings not to be determinative be-
cause they were "expressly premised on the true meaning of the language contained in
the specific mortgage agreements in each case." Id. at 980, 309 N.E.2d at 119. In
Durkee, the court also looked to the mortgage agreement and found that under the agree-
ment the payments did not constitute special deposits or trust funds and that, therefore,
defendant was not obligated to keep this money intact, separated, or segregated from
other funds. Id. at 983, 309 N.E.2d at 121.
78. 77 Misc. 2d 284, 353 N.Y.S.2d 104 (Queens County Sm. Cl. 1974).
79. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 32 comment 1, § 179 (1959). Often,
"escrow" describes the delivery of an instrument to a third party, the escrow agent, until
a stated condition for transfer occurs. But the term is not restricted to use with instru-
ments. The delivery into escrow creates a trust which carries the legal obligation to
segregate and hold the funds until the condition occurs. Id. In the tax and insurance
escrow, the condition that occurs is the arrival of the date when the bills are due. At that
time, the escrow holder (lender) must pay the bills.
80. 77 Misc. 2d at 288, 353 N.Y.S.2d at 109-10. The court discussed the historical
purpose of these deposits and the meaning of "security." Id. See generally TEMPLE
L.Q. Comment, supra note 4, at 352.
81. 1 A. Scorr, LAw OF TRUSTS § 12.2, at 112 (3d ed. 1967).
82. An account is presumed to be general unless it can be proven to be special. See
5A 4 MIcHIE ON BANKS AND BANKING, ch. 9, § 3 (Michie Pub. Co. ed. 1973).
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debtor-creditor relationship between the bank and customer and therefore no
fiduciary duty; a special account creates a bailment or trust relationship with
a resultant fiduciary duty requiring the bailee to segregate the entrusted
property or money and hold it until the bailor gives instructions for its
disposition; a special deposit for a specific purpose obligates the holder to
complete that purpose but does not permit the holder to use the deposit for
his own benefit.8 3 Thus, while the special deposit imposes a trust and the
general deposit does not, the special deposit for a specific purpose has both a
debt and trust character.
Many state courts, in considering breach of fiduciary duty allegations,
have weighed the circumstances surrounding the transactions at issue in the
context of motions to dismiss or for summary judgment, but few have
reached a decision on the merits. In the leading case of Carpenter v. Suffolk
Franklin Savings Bank,84 a Massachusetts court deemed the allegations
sufficient to state a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, reasoning
that federal regulatory authorization to collect and state statutory permission
to invest these funds did not preclude finding a trust relationship between
the parties and an obligation to pay profits and interest to the mortgagor.
Since the monthly payments were designated for real estate taxes, a specific
purpose seemed to exist which might render the bank a holder of an escrow.
The court concluded that if, at trial, the contract language, conduct of the
parties, and end to be accomplished further supported the existence of a
trust, then a breach of fiduciary duty would be found in the lender's use of
the funds for its own benefit.
In Buchanan v. Brentwood Federal Savings & Loan Association,85 the
cause of action was remanded after analysis of the facts to determine if a
trust had been established. The Pennsylvania court indicated that Massachu-
setts' Carpenter standard should be applied at trial when "'the mortgagor
pays funds to a bank with an expressed purpose that the funds shall be used
for a particular purpose, [and] then the funds may be deemed to be held in
trust.'"80 Additionally, the Buchanan court evaluated the argument that a
constructive trust should be imposed on the defendants which would require
the payment of the profits derived from the mortgagees' investments of the
deposits to the mortgagors. This issue was remanded as well, to the court of
equity, with the applicable standard that a constructive trust " 'arises' where
83. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 12 (1959). See generally Annot., 86
A.L.R. 375 (1933); 10 AM. JUR. 2D Banks §§ 337-66 (1963).
84. 291 N.E.2d 609 (Mass. 1973).
85. 457 Pa. 135, 320 A.2d 117 (1974).
86. Id. at 124, quoting Carpenter v. Suffolk Franklin Sav. Bank, 291 N.E.2d 609, 614
(Mass. 1973).
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a person who holds title to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey
it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were
permitted to retain it. ' 87 That the court undertook this substantive examina-
tion of the remedy when reviewing a motion to dismiss is possibly a prelim-
inary indication of its willingness to find a breach of fiduciary duty on the
facts of the case.
Courts in California and New York have upheld the breach of fiduciary
duty concept.8 8 A New York court upheld the theory of the claim, but dis-
missed the case due to a deficiency in the pleading,8 9 while another New
York court dismissed a similar claim after discovering the same technicality
and additional substantive reasons why the escrow practice did not constitute
a trust.9°
Since the cases have been inconclusive on the merits of the trust argument,
an independent analysis is necessary to decide whether these deposits, absent
an express agreement that manifests intent, constitute trusts or special
deposits. Such an analysis requires, initially, an examination of the circum-
stances surrounding escrow transactions.
A. Circumstances Surrounding Escrow Transactions
Although some federal regulations authorize the collection of monthly
escrow payments, 91 the mortgagor is still primarily responsible for the
payment of bills. Certainly, the lender who collects monthly payments for
taxes and insurance assumes an obligation to pay the bills when due;
otherwise he would be unjustly enriched. At issue is whether this obligation
is based on a contract theory or a theory of fiduciary duty accompanying the
deposits.
87. Id. at 126.
88. Abrams v. Crocker-Citizens Nat'l Bank, 41 Cal. App. 3d 55, 114 Cal. Rptr. 913
(Cal. App. 1974) (if trust argument proven, then plaintiffs may be entitled to equitable
accounting for any gain from the use of the funds); Raab v. Bowery Sav. Bank, 77 Misc.
2d 1054, 355 N.Y.S.2d 748 (N.Y. County Sm. Cl. 1974). The Raab court expressly dis-
agreed with the Tierney contract rationale. See p. 117 supra. Instead, the Raab court
decided that the escrow was a deposit for a specific purpose and ruled that the defendant
was not to commingle the funds or use them for its own benefit. Here, the plaintiffs
were held entitled to an equitable accounting for defendant's gains through use of these
deposits. 355 N.Y.S.2d at 751.
89. Id. at 751. The Small Claims Court does not have equitable jurisdiction. Since
this was deemed an equitable cause of action, the case was dismissed.
90. Menkis v. Whitestone Say. & Loan Ass'n, 356 N.Y.S.2d 485 (Nassau County Sm.
Cl. 1974). The court found that deposits pursuant to the mortgagor-mortgagee relation-
ship did not meet the trust requirement of a res, independent escrowee, conditional deliv-
ery to the escrowee, and depositor's relinquishment of all rights in the funds.
91. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11 (1975).
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Several factors support the argument that the obligation is solely a matter
of contract between the parties:9 2  the arrangement is ancillary to a
mortgage contract and serves as additional security for the loan; the
borrower remains primarily liable for the bills; there is a legal presumption
that deposits are general unless there is express intent to create a trust;93 no
trust res is segregated and maintained by the lender, and there is no
agreement that the identical money deposited be used to pay the bills.
Indeed, some statistics indicate that each account generates only 10 dollars
profit per year, a figure which, if accepted as accurate, would not seem to
justify imposing a trust.9 4
Yet countervailing factors support the contrary conclusion that the depos-
its are held in trust. The payments are made so that a lender can pay bills
when due and there is no evidence of intent to give the lender free use of the
funds for its own benefit and profit, as would be implied by a general
deposit. 5 Since interest bearing accounts ordinarily signify general depos-
its,9° it may be argued conversely that noninterest accounts for a specific
purpose indicate an intent to form a trust and to segregate the funds. In
addition, it is unlikely that borrowers would knowingly deposit money into a
noninterest account expecting lenders to use it in the same way that interest
bearing accounts are used. 97 Unlike a normal deposit, the escrow depositor
has no right to withdraw its money, the result being a separation of legal and
equitable ownership, as in any trust.
92. See Yudkin v. Avery Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 507 S.W.2d 689, 690 (Ky. 1974).
Plaintiffs filed suit to compel the lender to pay interest on the escrow accounts. The
court held that because the mortgage contract was silent on the payment of interest but
included a provision binding borrowers to the resolutions of the lender, and a long stand-
ing resolution was not to pay "dividends" on the escrows, there could be no implied con-
tract for the payment of such interest.
93. See notes 82-83 supra.
94. See Note, supra note 4, at 516. The estimate of profits is criticized be-
cause it presumes an annual average account of $400 at 5 percent interest, whereas
the average account and short term loan interest rate are actually higher. Id.
at 533-34. The author estimates that the actual industry-wide profits may total hundreds
of millions of dollars per year. See note 4 supra.
95. See Note, supra note 4, at 524.
96. See 1 A. Scorr, LAw OF TRUSTS 108-10 (3d ed. 1967).
97. Borrowers would not knowingly deposit money into these accounts unless they
needed the particular mortgage loan, or its terms were unique, in which case the borrow-
ers would deposit money knowingly into a noninterest account, but not voluntarily. See
generally 15 A. MIcHIE, BANKS AND BANKING, ch. 9, § 3 (1973). But see I G.
BOGERT & G. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 21, at 173 (2d ed. 1965), in which
the authors argue that a depositor does not expect the identical money to be used
to pay a debt to a third party and that therefore the arrangement should be deemed
a contract rather than a bailment.
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B. Importance ol the Regulatory Terminology
The language contained in the regulatory authorization for payments
should be examined closely.98 The FHLBB recently amended its regulation,
and the amendment refers to the payments as "escrow accounts." 99 The
FHA regulation mandates that these payments be collected and held "for the
benefit and account of the mortgagor."' 100 But the VA regulation, which
mandates the collection of these monthly payments, states that they must be
placed in a "reserve account." 101 While the accounts are ambiguously
named in the VA regulations, their characterization in the FHLBB and FHA
regulations indicates that the funds are not to be commingled, and that any
profits derived from the funds belong to the escrow for the benefit and
account of the borrower.
Other FHA regulations covering approval of lending institutions specifical-
ly require that nonsupervised mortgagees maintain the mortgagor's monthly
payments in a special account and order that the funds shall not be used for
any other purpose than that for which they were received. 10 2 In the section
explaining that the failure to segregate, or use for an unintended purpose,
shall result in withdrawal of approval as a mortgagee, the regulations refer to
the deposits as an "escrow fund.' 03 Certainly FHA mortgagees must
maintain accounts meeting all the technical legal requirements of escrows. If
the accounts are invested by the mortgagee for its own benefit, there exists a
breach of fiduciary duty. A possible remedy for the mortgagor is to trace the
profits through an equitable accounting. 04 Since the identical purpose of the
accounts held by both FHA and non-FHA mortgagees is to additionally
secure the loan, there is no reason to characterize the deposits as something
other than true escrow accounts, as intended by the FHA. Had the authors
of the regulations intended a different interpretation, they would not have
termed the deposits "escrows."
C. General Banking Law Analysis
The conclusion that tax and insurance accounts should be considered true
escrows is further supported by an examination of the banking cases
98. Close examination is especially necessary since the courts in cases such as Sears,
Zelickman, Tierney and Carpenter have placed great importance on the contract lan-
guage used in each case.
99. 40 Fed. Reg. 4661 (1975).
100. 12 C.F.R. § 203.23 (1975).
101. 38 C.F.R. § 36.4512 (1974).
102. 24 C.F.R. § 203.4(c)(2) (1975).
103. Id. § 203.7.
104. See Raab v. Bowery Say. Bank, 77 Misc. 2d 1054, 355 N.Y.S.2d 748, 751 (N.Y.
County Sm. Cl. 1974).
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involving special deposits. The issue of which type of account-general,
special, or special account for a specific purpose-is created by deposits
usually arises when a bank becomes insolvent. In order to gain preference
when a trustee distributes the bank's assets, a depositor must prove that his
deposit was held in trust or as a special account. The issues raised in the
cases are similar to those involved in the disputes over the monthly tax and
insurance payments.
Early cases found that when a bank became insolvent, "the circumstances
of the deposit may give rise to an agency relation, a contract for the benefit
of a third person, or, infrequently, a trust. . . .The difficulty encountered is
the lack of a definite trust res."' 05 Even then, however, if the case involved
fraud on the part of the bank when a trust was intended, the courts would
permit tracing into the general bank funds, allowing the proper sum, if
ascertainable, to constitute the trust res.106 Thus, there is precedent for
imposing a trust on general bank funds even though the money deposited
was commingled, as long as the amount that would have been the res is
calculable.
In the seminal case of In re Interborough Consolidated Corp.,107 the
concept of a special deposit for a specific purpose was developed. Money
was deposited to 'be paid to Interborough for a debt of the depositor. The
court noted that this was an "ABC case" - one in which A places money in
the hands of B to be delivered to C, and for no other purpose. This
transaction was deemed to have created a trust and a fiduciary relationship
arising therefrom.108 Similarly, deposits for tax, insurance, and assessments
fit the ABC framework and may create a fiduciary duty to use the funds for
no other purpose than that intended.
In the 1930's, when many banks failed due to insolvency, the question of
whether an account was special or general was frequently litigated. 'For
105. Note, 6 MINN. L. REv. 306, 307 (1922). See, e.g., In re Interborough Consol.
Corp., 288 F. 334 (2d Cir. 1973); Andrew v. Union Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 220 Iowa
712,263 N.W. 495 (1935).
106. See, e.g., Hitt Fireworks Co. v. Scandinavian Am. Bank, 121 Wash. 261, 209
P. 680 (1922) (when money earned was given to bank cashier with informal understand-
ing that it be held by the bank as a special deposit, but the cashier deposited it as a
general deposit, tracing was permitted); Carlson v. Kies, 75 Wash. 171, 134 P. 808
(1913) (when estate administrator placed monies in bank pending response from heirs,
and bank wrongfully commingled this money with its general funds, tracing was al-
lowed). Tracing is the equitable procedure of following earmarked cash when it is com-
mingled or transformed into proceeds. See Note, 32 YALE L.J. 410 (1922).
107. 288 F. 334 (2d Cir. 1923).
108. Id. at 347. See Guidise v, Island Ref. Corp., 291 F. 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1923)
(Learned Hand, J., upheld the ABC theory); Note, supra note 4, at 521, for a fuller
discussion of the ABC case theory.
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example, in the principal case of Andrew v. Union Savings Bank & Trust
Co.,109 a creditor attached the bank account of his debtor and the bank
subsequently went into receivership. The creditor argued that this attachment,
filed prior to insolvency, transformed the general account into a special one
and entitled him, not the bank's general creditors, to the assets in the
account. In rejecting this contention, the court stated:
A different rule applies where money is merely left with the bank
under an arrangement with the bank that the money is to be
used by the bank for some special purpose as, for example, to
turn over to a particular person or to pay a particular debt. In
all such cases the money does not become the property of the
bank. The fund is merely intrusted [sic] to the bank as a trustee
or bailee without any authority on the part of the bank to use
it as its own. 1 0
The circumstances governed by this rule are identical to those in the tax and
insurance deposit situation: both involve an arrangement to pay a third party
for a debt incurred by the depositor.
Courts have differed over the issue presented in Andrew of whether bank
accounts are special so as to justify a preference after a bank's failure.
Generally, a third party creditor is permitted to enforce a trust more often
than a depositor who tries to have his deposit returned."' Since the ABC
nature of the transactions is the same, there is no reason to distinguish the
characterization of the deposits for tax and insurance from these banking
cases.
Another type of case lends considerable support to the conclusion that the
tax and insurance accounts are escrows or special deposits. In Liberty
National Life Insurance Co. v. United States, 1 2 the plaintiff insurance
company was a mortgage lender using the escrow method and commingling
the deposits with other funds. At issue in the case was whether these escrow
funds, which formed a larger sum than Liberty's insurance-related funds,
constituted "assets" for the purpose of calculating federal income tax. The
court found that they were trust funds which could not be disbursed for any
purpose other than to pay bills, and commingling did not destroy their
109. 220 Iowa 712, 263 N.W. 495 (1935).
110. Id. at 715, 263 N.W. at 497. See also State v. Platte Valley State Bank of
Scottsbluff, 130 Neb. 222, 264 N.W. 421 (1936) (a simple designation that the deposit
was held pending the outcome of a suit was sufficient to create a special deposit for
a specific purpose); Annot., 50 A.L.R.3d 697 (1973) (rights in funds representing
"escrow" payments made by mortgagor in advance to cover taxes or insurance).
111. 1 G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, supra note 97, at 173-74.
112. 463 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1972). The insurance company was seeking a tax re-
fund.
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trust nature.113 Liberty was prohibited from investing the funds in the future
or retaining any income from funds already invested. 1 4 In a footnote, the
court explained that paying over the interest derived is based on a general
principle of law."15 Although the court failed to define the principle, it is
apparent that unjust enrichment due to breach of fiduciary duty was the one
intended. The court continued by quoting a dictate of the Department of
Housing and Urban Development concerning FH-A loans:
[W]henever a mortgagee invests escrow funds in interest-bearing
accounts the interest must accrue to the benefit of the mortgagor
rather than to the benefit of the mortgagee. It is FHA's position
that a mortgagee who deposited escrow funds in an account
bearing interest for the benefit of the mortgagee would be in
violation of FHA regulations.""
Since there is no basis for distinguishing between the security purposes of
FHA and non-FHA loans, these standards should be applied generally. Nor
is it sensible to distinguish between insurance companies and other institu-
tions when they function as mortgagees, because they are engaged in the
same profitmaking business of lending to real property purchasers. Using
analogous reasoning, then, profits derived from any mortgagee's investment
of the funds should go to the mortgagors.
III. LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE SOLUTIONS
Viewed in their entirety, the relevant regulatory language, the nature and
purpose of the tax and insurance deposits, the banking cases, and the tax
case are persuasive evidence that the escrow account should be viewed as a
trust. Recently, legislatures and agencies have reacted to this situation with
compromise remedies tending to favor the borrowers.
Consumer borrower-oriented state legislation is the primary source of
reform. Most of the new statutes require that the lender pay interest on
the accumulation of the mortgagor's monthly payments. Interestingly, the
FHLBB has issued new regulations restricting the effect of the statutes to
certain limited circumstances. 17 No statute or regulation has ordered mort-
gagees to pay profits to the borrowers.
One of the earlier statutes was that of New Hampshire, which requires all
lenders to pay interest on escrow accounts maintained for the payment of
113. Id. at 1029. See notes 79, 82-83 & accompanying text supra for discussion
of the duty of a trustee not to commingle trust and general funds.
114. Id. at 1030.
115. Id. n.6.
116. Id.
117. See note 135 & accompanying text infra.
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taxes, insurance premiums, and other assessments.118 The rate is set at "not
less than two percent below the rate paid on regular savings deposits in said
bank."119
New Mexico's statute does not require payment of interest 'but merely
discourages accumulation of excessive escrow deposits. Upon a mortgagor's
demand, a lender holding an escrow account must credit any money deposited
in excess over the annual taxes, insurance premiums and assessments towards
the principal amount of the mortgage.1 20 Alternatively, the parties can con-
tract for another disposition of the excess. A penalty for noncompliance is
set at six percent annual interest on the excess amount. In Arizona, a some-
what different statute requires that all money deposited in escrow be kept
separate from other funds.121 Interest received on the escrow must be paid
to the depositor and shall not become part of the escrow agent's funds. But
the section expressly states that this requirement shall not restrain the par-
ties from contracting as to the disposition of the interest. The statute is ambig-
uous in that "interest" is not defined as either a rate comparable to that
earned on general deposits or the amount of profit generated by the mort-
gagees' investment of the funds.
More recent statutes mandate the payment of interest but limit the effect
to a smaller class of mortgages. In Connecticut, a minimum of two percent
interest is to be paid to mortgagors of owner-occupied residential property
consisting of not more than four living units.1 22 In Massachusetts, the law
requires that interest be paid (at a rate determined by the mortgagee) only
by the first mortgagee on dwellings that include no more than four separate
households, or are owner-occupied.12
New York's recently enacted statute is complex, requiring that interest be
paid pursuant to state banking board regulations for a one to six family
residence that is owner-occupied. 124 This provision is subject to several
exceptions: no interest shall be paid when there is a prior express contract
disclaiming this responsibility, when a federal law or regulation would be
violated, or when a prior contract exists with a nonlending institution to hold
the escrow. The interest is established at an annual rate of not less than two
percent, calculated on the average of the sums in the account for an average
length of time, or as established by the banking board.126
118. 4 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 384:16-C (Supp. 1973).
119. Id.
120. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-7-8 (Supp. 1973).
121. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 6-834 (1974).
122. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-2a (Supp. 1975).
123. MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 183, § 61 (Supp. 1975).
124. N.Y. BANK. LAW § 14-b (McKinney Supp. 1975).
125. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. § 5-601 (McKinney Supp. 1975). The statute's complexity
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Although some of these statutes indicate an intent to defer to a contract
between the parties, they consistently recognize the continuing stake of the
mortgagor in the deposits. It is significant that many of the statutes call the
accounts "escrows." 120 Presumably, legislators intend the legal consequences
which flow from their choice of words. If these accounts are actually escrows,
then mortgagors are not precluded from pursuing a cause of action for profits
generated due to the lender's breach of fiduciary duty in using the fund for
its own benefit.
In contrast to this trend, Louisiana's recently enacted statute does not use
the term "escrow" or require the payment of interest. Instead, the statute
mandates that the monthly deposits "be held, without interest, for the credit
of the borrower. ' 127 Thus, it could be interpreted as creating a noninterest
special deposit for a specific purpose and a trust for the benefit of the
mortgagors. If the lender commingles and invests the funds, the borrower
may have both common law and statutorily based claims for breach of
fiduciary duty.
New York's statute has been attacked as unconstitutional in Jamaica
Savings Bank v. Lefkowitz s28 and Federal National Mortgage Association
v. Lefkowitz. 12 Jamaica Savings argued that a mortgage contract entered
into prior to enactment of the relevant legislation was impaired because the
noninterest account was essentially a bargained-for term. The court found no
evidence to prove that bargaining took place, and held that in the absence of
a contract provision for the use and disposition of income derived from escrow
accounts, it could not be established that nonpayment of interest was a
contract term. 130 A second contention, that the statute effected a taking
without due process, was rejected after the court decided that the bank never
had a beneficial interest in the funds, since the escrow accounts were never
intended to be used by the mortgage institution for its own benefit.181 In
is thus due not only to division of the provisions into two separate code sections, but
also because exceptions to the mandate that interest be paid create many loopholes which
permit lenders to avoid paying the miniscule two percent interest.
126. See, e.g., 4 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 384:16-C (Supp. 1973), which provides:
Any bank which requires or accepts money for deposit in escrow accounts
maintained for the payment of taxes, insurance premiums or other expenses re-
lated to loans on property secured by real estate mortgages shall credit each
such escrow account with interest at a rate not less than two percent below
the rate paid on regular savings deposits in said bank.
127. LA. REV. STAT. § 6:828 (Supp. 1975).
128. 390 F. Supp. 1357 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
129. 390 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
130. Id. at 1360-62. The bargaining issue may develop, eventually, into an uncon-
scionability argument. See TEMPLE L.Q. Comment, supra note 4, at 360.
131. 390 F. Supp. at 1367.
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Federal National Mortgage Association, the court followed the reasoning of
Jamaica Savings and reached the same conclusions. In addition, it contended
that a state statute can subject a federal instrumentality to state law under
certain circumstances. 8 2 Thus, these cases, which establish the state's power
to mandate the payment of interest on escrow accounts, further support the
argument that these funds are true escrow accounts or special deposits.
The FHLBB has also responded to the controversy surrounding these
deposits. On October 24, 1974, in an attempt to preempt state authority, the
agency proposed an amendment to the existing regulation. 88 Three months
later, the FHLBB modified its position and proposed a revised, more
complex amendment.'3 4 After receiving comments on the proposal and
making a few changes, the FHLBB issued the final version, effective June
16, 1975,185 which operates prospectively to avoid impairment of existing
132. Id. at 1368. The issue of whether the FHLBB regulations preempt any state
laws was not justiciable in this case. However, this is an issue likely to be raised in
future litigation.
133. 39 Fed. Reg. 41386 (1974). The proposed amendment states in relevant part:
The payment of interest on the amount of advance payments of charges as de-
scribed in the preceding sentence [for taxes, insurance premiums and other
assessments] is solely a matter of contract between a Federal association and
borrowers therefrom, without regard to any provision of State law relating to
payment of interest.
134. 40 Fed. Reg. 4661 (1975). Interest would be paid on "escrow accounts":
(1) Only if contracted for by Federal association and borrower, except if the
loan:
(a) is made on a single-family dwelling to be occupied by borrower,
(b) the dwelling is located in a State where State chartered thrift institu-
tions generally are so required, and
(c) the loan is made on or after the effective date of the regulation .
(2) If interest payment required, payment shall be at not less than State rate
but not in excess of passbook rate.
Id.
135. FHLBB, Amendment Relating to Escrow Funds, No. 75-415 (May 9, 1975).
12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11 will include this provision:
(c) Payment of interest on escrow accounts. A Federal association which
makes a loan on or after June 16, 1975 on the security of a single-family dwell-
ing occupied or to be occupied by the borrower (except such a loan for which
a bona fide commitment was made before that date) shall pay interest on any
escrow account maintained in connection with such a loan (I) if there is in
effect a specific statutory provision or provisions of the State in which such
dwelling is located by or under which State-chartered savings and loan associa-
tions, mutual savings banks and similar institutions are generally required to
pay interest on such escrow accounts, and (2) at not less than the rate required
to be paid by such State-chartered institutions but not to exceed the rate being
paid by the Federal association on its regular accounts . . . . Except as pro-
vided by contract, a Federal association shall have no obligation to pay inter-
est on escrow accounts apart from the duties imposed by this paragraph.
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contracts. It is a restrictive provision, extending no further than to give effect
to state statutes mandating the payment of interest.136 The regulation
restricts the rate to a sum not greater than that paid by federal associations
on regular accounts, regardless of the state's set rate. This regula-
tion, however, raises still another question: whether a state statute or the
FHLBB has controlling authority to set the interest rate. 3 7 Undoubtedly,
this issue will soon be litigated.
Most noteworthy in the FHLBB amendment is the characterization of
these deposits as "escrow accounts." Again, given a legislative intent to
construe the term in its strict legal sense, mortgagors would seem to have
federal authority for the fiduciary duty argument. Clearly, the right to trace
profits derived is a more lucrative endeavor than receiving statutory interest
on the deposits.
IV. CONCLUSION
Lending institutions are caught in the middle of the FHLBB, protective
courts, progressive courts, state legislators, and consumer advocates. The
mandate that they pay interest forces lenders to use the funds for their own
benefit to offset interest payments. It is this use that breaches the fiduciary
duty of the "special account for a specific purpose" and permits the
mortgagor to trace and demand the profits derived from the funds. Lending
institutions have available the options of absorbing the cost of paying
interest, continuing to invest the funds, or returning to the capitalization
method. Capitalization, the institutions contend, is not as profitable as the
escrow method, 38 and originally the switchover to escrows was an attempt
to increase profits. But it seems inconceivable that the administrative costs of
capitalization exceed costs of maintaining escrow accounts. Lending institu-
136. The rationale underlying the FHLBB's restrictive approach, which works to the
detriment of borrowers, appears to be that each individual mortgagor would gain only
a minimal amount if the mortgagee were required to distribute profits derived. How-
ever, this assumption by the FHLBB is based upon the low estimates of profits resulting
from the use of the accounts propounded by the lending institutions themselves. The
FHLBB comment folder includes numerous responses from mortgagees indicating that
the profits derived from the escrow deposits defray administrative costs otherwise charge-
able to the mortgagor. Even when the estimates concede that a profit is derived, the
amount stated is usually a mere 10 or 20 dollars. Since the FHLBB represents banking
interests, its reliance on the mortgagees' estimates is not surprising, nor is its restrictive
regulation. See FHLBB Comments Folder, supra note 4.
137. Jamaica Savings v. Lefkowitz, 390 F. Supp. 1357 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), and Federal
Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Lefkowitz, 390 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), indicate that
a state statute may interfere with the federal regulatory body under certain circum-
stances.
138. See FHLBB Comments Folder, supra note 4.
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tions continuing the escrow practice of commingling and investing the funds
risk a law suit and possible judgment requiring that all profits derived be
turned over to the borrowers. Unless the lenders are deriving enormous
profits through these investments, the risk of loss through a judgment ought
to justify abolition of the escrow practice. Besides being a prudent course for
the careful lender, doing away with the escrow practice would be applauded
by consumer advocates as a good faith effort to end deceptive mortgage
lending practices. A prudent lender might be rewarded with an influx of
reliable borrowers searching for the fairest terms, thereby increasing the
profits from its mortgage lending.
Since the escrow practice is still predominant among lending institu-
tions,13 9 greater mortgagor protection concerning these monthly payments
is required. The next step must be in one of two directions: either a
concerted lobbying effort to influence the FHLBB, other agencies, and state
legislatures to broaden the payment of interest provisions, or the pursuit of
lawsuits for breach of fiduciary duty, as outlined above. Lobbying is an
expensive and long-range undertaking which may result in a uniform
national statute mandating the payment of interest, but it is unlikely from a
practical standpoint that statutes will order the payment of profits derived
from use of the escrow funds, as the legislation discussed above indicates. On
the other hand, law suits are comparatively less expensive to pursue. While
the litigious approach has the disadvantage of touching only a limited
community of defendants, it may result in an equitable accounting for profits
earned or treble damages for an antitrust violation. Aside from its financial
advantages, it is probably a swifter course than lobbying for years to achieve
passage of a compromise statute. In addition, if a sufficient number of courts
find violations in the escrow practice, more effective administrative and
legislative action may be elicited. Consequently, the lawsuit, at least in the
short run, seems the more fruitful course of action and one that seems likely
to be pursued while the interest of the courts, legislatures, and administrative
bodies is at its present height.
Ronald H. Jarashow
139. Id.
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